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Abstract
The current tax treatment of pensions and health insurance in the United States is a hybrid
that lacks consistency under either an accrual income tax system or a consumption tax system.
Under an accrual income tax, employer contributions to pension plans represent an addition to
wealth that would be taxed at the time they are made. The interest earned on pension contributions
also represents an addition to wealth that would be taxed annually. When a worker retires, all
applicable taxes would already have been paid on the benefit, and the flow of retirement income
received by the worker would not be taxed. Similarly, employer-provided health insurance
arguably represents a current benefit that, under the income tax, should be taxed annually as
current income.1
Under a consumption tax, things are different for pensions. The idea of the consumption
tax is to tax what an individual takes out of the system. Since pension contributions represent
saving, they are not taxed when they are made. Neither is the interest earned on pension
contributions taxed under a consumption tax, since it is reinvested and accumulated. Only when
the worker retires and starts to draw retirement income are pension contributions taxed. And only
the portion of the retirement income that is consumed is taxed—if only half is consumed, taxes
are paid only on that half.
Although pensions fare better under a consumption tax than under an income tax, it is
unclear whether health insurance would, too. If health insurance expenditures are considered
current consumption (as most economists believe they should be), the same tax that applied to any
other consumption would apply to employer contributions to health insurance. On the other hand,
one could argue (as in footnote 3) that health insurance is a merit good and medical expenditures
are unfortunate, so that both pensions and health insurance should be excluded from the definition
of consumption.
The existing tax treatment of employee benefits in the U.S. is a hybrid because we
nominally have an income tax under which employer contributions to both pensions and health
insurance could be taxed as income. But both receive favorable tax treatment—pensions are
tax-favored in that current pension contributions and interest on previous contributions go
untaxed, and health insurance contributions are tax-free. The tax treatment of pensions is
consistent with a consumption tax, not an income tax, and the prevailing view among economists
is that the tax treatment of health insurance is consistent with neither.
1

As Bradford (1986, p. 20) has noted, there may be a case for excluding medical expenditures from the definition of
accrual income if we believe that medical expenditures are unfortunate and do not contribute to utility. Similarly, if health
insurance were defined as a merit good, then we might want to exclude health insurance contributions from the definition
of accrual income, as is now done with employer contributions to group health insurance. However, considerations of
efficiency, first articulated by Feldstein (1973), argue for including employer contributions to health insurance in the
income tax base.

Current attempts to move toward a consumption tax have been welcomed by most
economists both because most subscribe to the basic claims that are made for the consumption
tax—increased saving, improved economic growth, and greater efficiency—and because the
consumption tax promises to bring greater coherence to a system that, despite improvements
during the last 15 years, still has some basic inconsistencies.
Major concerns with the consumption tax have been raised by many employers, though,
who are comfortable with the existing tax treatment of employee benefits and less obsessed than
economists with the notion of allocative efficiency or with making the tax system conform to a
consistent theory of taxation. Employers—especially employers of skilled labor—have at least two
reasons for wanting to provide employee benefits and accordingly find the favorable tax treatment
of benefits attractive (Rosen forthcoming). First, provision of employee benefits may have
externalities that enhance the productivity of workers. For example, employers may want to
ensure that their workers have good access to health care so that they are more likely to stay
healthy. And they may want to provide pension benefits to workers to relieve workers of the
burden and worry of planning and providing for retirement. Second, benefits provide a way for
employers to create a bond between the firm and the worker. Such a bond and the commitment
between the worker and firm that is implied are especially important in firms where workers have
(or need to acquire) a significant amount of firm-specific human capital. Employers, who must
bear most or all of the cost of investing in firm-specific training, can reap the returns to their
investment only if workers remain with the firm over a long period of time.
The importance of these two effects has not been quantified convincingly, although there
is some evidence that the latter is important (see, for example, the review by Hutchens 1989, or
the evidence presented by Topel 1991). But existing evidence suggests that the loss of favorable
tax treatment of employee benefits would make it more costly for employers to provide benefits
and could indeed lead to social costs in the form of broken job matches that efficiency
considerations would suggest should have continued.
Section I below briefly discusses the essential features and implications for employee
benefits of some of the tax reform proposals that were introduced during the 104th Congress and
promise to be considered further in the future. Section II then presents some estimates of how
these comprehensive tax reforms would affect (a) the coverage of workers by employer-provided
pension and health-insurance plans, (b) employer contributions to pension and health insurance
plans, and (c) the shares of compensation received as pensions and health insurance.
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I.

Proposals to Change the Tax Treatment of Employee Benefits

A common feature of recently proposed tax reforms is to eliminate the tax advantage that
has long been enjoyed by employer contributions to employee benefit plans. The proposals
eliminate this tax-favored status by either of two approaches. The first is to move toward a
consumption tax under which (a) savings are untaxed regardless of whether they are in the form
of qualified pension savings (so that there is no longer a tax advantage to saving through an
employer-based retirement plan), and (b) employer contributions to health insurance are
considered consumption, and hence taxed. Several such proposals were introduced during the
104th Congress, including the so-called USA Tax proposal of Senators Nunn and Domenici and
flat tax proposals introduced by Representative Armey and Senators Shelby and Spector. All have
the essential features of a consumption tax (Salisbury 1995; Heitzman 1995; Gruber and Poterba
1996).
The second approach would be to tax employer contributions to pension and health
insurance plans in the year they are made under the existing personal income tax. This is a
proposal that has had at least one vocal advocate for some years (Munnell 1989) and is included
in Representative Gephardt's so-called progressive flat-tax, which retains most of the basic
features of the existing tax system but broadens the tax base to include employer contributions
to pension and health insurance plans (Salisbury 1995; Gruber and Poterba 1996).
The economic incentives created by eliminating the tax-favored status of employee benefits
on employer- provided pensions are clear. A consumption tax would place all saving on the same
footing and would remove the tax-favored position of contributions to an employer- provided
pension plan compared with other forms of saving. A dollar not consumed would not be taxed
in the current year, whether it was contributed to a pension plan or deposited in any other
instrument of saving. It follows that the pure tax incentive for workers to receive compensation
in the form of pension contributions would be removed, and that, over time, as labor markets
adjusted to the new situation, pension contributions and coverage would fall. Similarly, taxing
employee contributions to health insurance would remove the tax incentive for workers to demand
such benefits and would reduce health insurance contributions and coverage.
II.

Impacts of Tax Reform on Employee-Benefit Provision

Table 1 shows the results of some simulations that suggest how removing the tax-favored
treatment of employee benefits would alter three measures of employee benefit provision: (a) the
percentage of wage and salary workers (aged 25 and older) who are covered by employerprovided pension and health insurance plans; (b) the aggregate dollar contributions by employers
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to pensions and health insurance plans; and (c) the share of total compensation received by
workers as pensions and health insurance.2
Column 1 of Table 1 shows actual levels of employee coverage, employer contributions,
and compensation shares in 1993-94—that is, under the existing income tax in which pension plan
contributions are tax-deferred and health insurance contributions are tax-free. Columns 2, 3, and
4 show how these measures of benefit provision might change under three changes to the existing
income tax. In column 2, pension plan contributions are still tax-deferred but health insurance
contributions above a relatively low "cap" are taxed as income. The tax cap simulated in column
2 is $1,750 (current dollars), which is approximately the cost of annual catastrophic health
insurance coverage. In column 3, pension plan contributions remain tax-deferred but all health
insurance contributions are taxed as income. In column 4, all employer contributions to pension
plans and to group health insurance are taxed as income, as would occur under Representative
Gephardt's proposed reforms of the income tax.
Finally, column 5 shows simulations of the changes that would occur under a consumption
tax. Here, pension contributions have no tax advantage over other form of retirement saving.
Also, health insurance contributions are taxed as consumption. This is essentially the tax
treatment of employee benefits that has been proposed by Senators Nunn and Domenici in their
USA Tax and by Representative Armey and Senators Shelby and Spector in their flat tax
proposals.
Each of the simulated changes in Table 1 should be thought of as a point estimate that has
some error and uncertainty associated with it. Accordingly, each point estimate in Table 1 is
accompanied by an estimated simulation error in parentheses.3 Each error estimate can be used
to construct the 95-percent confidence interval for the simulated change in question. Adding the
error estimate to the point estimate gives the upper bound of the 95-percent confidence interval,
and subtracting the error estimate from the point estimate gives the lower bound of the 95-percent
confidence interval. For example, the simulated reduction in pension coverage that would follow
a move to a consumption tax is 5.5 percentage points (see column 5). This point estimate has a
simulation error of 2.3 percentage points associated with it, yielding a 95-percent confidence
interval of 3.2 percentage points to 7.8 percentage points. In the discussion below, each point
estimate is reported with its simulation error in parentheses—for example, the decrease in pension
2

The simulations presented in Table 1 assume that the deductibility of employer contributions under payroll and
corporation income taxes would be preserved under any tax reform. I know of no estimates that would provide a way
of estimating the impacts of changing the tax treatment of benefits under payroll and corporation income taxes.
3

The source of uncertainty considered in constructing the error estimates is error (or uncertainty) in the behavioral
estimates that underlie the simulations. A larger error associated with an underlying behavioral parameter leads to a larger
simulation error. In some cases, more than one behavioral parameter is used to obtain a simulated impact, and the error
associated with the simulated impact is larger as a result. In constructing these simulation error estimates, one could also
consider error in the estimated changes that drive the simulated changes in question. For example, there is error
associated with the estimated change in marginal tax rates that would accompany any tax reform. I have not attempted
to incorporate this latter source of error in the simulation error estimates reported in Table 1.
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coverage that follows adoption of a consumption tax is reported as "5.5 percentage points (±2.3
percentage points)."
Two types of simulation underlie the estimates in Table 1. The simulated changes in
employee coverage (the first two rows) were obtained by taking behavioral estimates of the
responsiveness of employee benefit coverage to changes in marginal income tax rates and
applying those behavioral estimates to 1993 employee benefit coverage data. The behavioral
estimates were obtained by estimating coverage equations for pensions and health insurance using
the 1988 Current Population Survey and supplemental data sources (Woodbury and Bettinger
1991). The coverage equations used workers aged 25 and older as the unit of observation and
included among the explanatory variables a measure of the tax-price of employee benefits, which
in turn was based on the marginal tax rate faced by a worker under federal and state income
taxes. The higher the marginal tax rate faced by a worker, the lower the tax-price of employee
benefits and the greater the incentive to receive compensation in the form of pensions and health
insurance. The estimates used in these simulations suggest that a one percentage point increase
in the marginal tax rate increases benefit coverage by about .24 to .30 percentage points for
pensions and by about .1 to .13 percentage points for health insurance.4 The coverage simulations
are discussed further in subsection A below.5
The simulated changes in employer contributions to pensions and health insurance (the
middle two rows of Table 1) and the simulated changes in the share of total compensation
received as pensions and health insurance (the bottom two rows) were obtained from a consumer
theoretic model and behavioral estimates that take account of the possibilities for substitution
among wages, pension benefits, and health insurance benefits. (The model and estimates are
described in detail in Woodbury and Huang 1991). The behavioral estimates were applied to 1994
data on employer contributions and benefit compensation shares from the National Income and
Product Accounts (Survey of Current Business January/February 1996, tables 6.3C and 6.11C).
The estimates underlying these latter simulations are based on a complete system that allows
interaction among the demands for wages, pensions, and health insurance, so that treating
employer contributions to group health insurance as taxable can lead to changes in the demand
for pensions as well as to changes in the demand for health insurance, even without any income
effects. (This could not occur in the coverage simulations, which are based on a simpler

4

Reagan and Turner (1994) have produced similar results for pension coverage, also using Current Population Survey
data but using a somewhat different specification of the tax-price variable. Their results suggest that a one percentage
point increase in marginal tax rates leads to a .4 percentage point increase in pension coverage for men and to a somewhat
smaller increase in pension coverage for women.
5

The coverage simulations also allow for income tax reform to affect pension and health insurance coverage through
changes in disposable income. These changes in disposable income that accompany income tax reform were simulated
in Woodbury and Huang (1991). I assume that moving to a consumption tax would be revenue neutral and hence would
have no income effects (see the next footnote).
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estimating procedure.) The employer contribution and compensation share simulations are
discussed in subsection B.6
A.

Effects on Employee Coverage

The rows of Table 1 labeled Employee Coverage show, first, that 57 percent of wage and
salary workers in 1993 were covered by an employer-provided pension plan and that nearly 68
percent were covered by employer- provided group health insurance. The simulations displayed
in columns 2 and 3 show the results of taxing (partially or fully) health insurance contributions
but leaving pension contributions untaxed. The simulation in column 2 suggests that a low annual
tax-cap of $1,750 on health insurance contributions would have reduced health insurance coverage
by .8 percentage points (±.7 percentage points). The simulation in column 3 suggests that
including all health insurance contributions in the income tax base in 1993 would have reduced
health insurance coverage by 2.6 percentage points (±2.1 percentage points).
Column 4 simulates the effects of the income tax reforms proposed by Representative
Gephardt, in which all pension and health insurance contributions are taxed as income. These
simulations suggest that taxing both pension and health contributions as income in 1993 would
have reduced pension coverage by 6.2 percentage points (±2.7 percentage points), and would
have reduced health insurance coverage by 3.1 percentage points (±2.3 percentage points).
Finally, column 5 simulates the effects of implementing a consumption tax (in which
pensions are no longer tax-favored and health insurance contributions are taxed as consumption).
These simulations suggest that if a consumption tax had been in place in 1993, pension
contributions would have been lower by 5.5 percentage points (±2.3 percentage points), and
health insurance contributions would have been lower by 2.3 percent (±2.0 percentage points).

6

The differences between the simulated changes under a reformed income tax (columns 2, 3, and 4) and the simulated
changes under the consumption tax (column 5) stem from assumptions that I have made about how a reformed income
tax and a newly implemented consumption tax would affect household incomes. Specifically, I assume that removing the
tax-favored treatment of employee benefits under the income tax would reduce disposable incomes by broadening the tax
base without reducing tax rates—that is, there would be an increase in taxes paid by households under the reformed
system. In contrast, I assume that moving to a consumption tax would not reduce disposable incomes because income
reductions that would result from the loss of tax-favored treatment of benefits would be compensated by reduced tax rates
(and possibly by the increased growth that advocates of the consumption tax promise). In large part, these assumptions
are based on political considerations; that is, the fact that advocates of broadening the base of the income tax to include
employee benefits see a need to increase federal revenues in order to balance the budget, whereas advocates of the
consumption tax appear committed to deficit reduction through reductions in federal spending. The assumptions, then,
are that broadening the tax base of the income tax to include employee benefits would not be revenue neutralbut that
moving to a consumption tax would be revenue neutral. Neither assumption is necessary, and the differences between
columns 4 and 5 show the differences between tax reforms that are and are not revenue neutral. The effects of tax
reforms on employee benefits under various assumptions about income effects and revenue neutrality are discussed in
Woodbury and Huang (1991).
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Clearly, both pension and health insurance coverage would suffer if pension and health
insurance contributions were taxed (as under the Gephardt proposal) or if a consumption tax were
adopted. Also, pension coverage would suffer more than would health insurance coverage both
in absolute and relative terms. The greater drop in pension coverage occurs because the estimates
underlying the simulations suggest that the the tax-price elasticity of demand for pensions exceeds
the the tax-price elasticity of demand for health insurance, a result that makes sense in light of
the fact that pensions are essentially deferred cash whereas health insurance is in-kind
compensation. The reductions in pension and health insurance coverage are not to be sneezed
at—a 1 percentage point reduction in employee benefit coverage means that about 1.25 million
fewer workers would be covered by a benefit. So the 5.5 percentage point reduction in pension
coverage implies that nearly 7 million fewer workers would be covered by an employer-provided
pension, and the 2.3 percentage point reduction in health insurance coverage implies that nearly
3 million fewer workers would be covered by employer- provided health insurance. Although
significant, these reductions do not suggest that sweeping tax reform would demolish the
voluntary pension and health insurance systems. Even the gloomiest simulations suggest that if
all employer contributions to employee benefits were taxed under the income tax, about 48
percent of all workers would remain covered by an employer-provided pension plan and over 64
percent would remain covered by an employer- provided health plan.
Employers suggest that they would curtail their provision of benefits far more dramatically
than do the coverage simulations reported in the top to rows of Table 1. What are we to believe?
There are two weaknesses inherent in the behavioral estimates that are the basis of the simulations
reported in Table 1. First, they amount to out-of-sample forecasts or extrapolations that may be
unreliable. Second, the behavioral responses on which they are based were obtained using data
that are now between 8 and 14 years old, and it is possible that behavior has changed or that
exogenous changes have occurred that would make these estimated behavioral responses
inaccurate today.
On the other hand, employers may or may not be good predictors of how they would react
to changes in the tax treatment of benefits. Moreover, employers have an interest in retaining the
existing tax treatment of benefits and may overstate their negative reaction to loss of that
tax-favored treatment in order to keep law-makers from changing a policy from which they
believe they benefit. So although the coverage simulations may underestimate the reductions in
benefit coverage that would follow loss of tax-favored treatment, employers' protestations may
overstate these reductions. There is, of course, a middle ground: Although favorable tax treatment
has greatly enhanced the coverage of workers by benefits, favorable tax treatment is not solely
responsible for employer-provision of benefits. It follows that removing the tax-favored treatment
of benefits would significantly reduce benefit coverage without wholly eliminating it.
B.

Effects on Employer Contributions and Compensation Shares

The middle rows of Table 1 show employer contributions (in $ billions) to pension and
group health insurance plans. Column 1 shows that, in 1994, employer contributions to pension
plans totaled $87.7 billion, and employer contributions to group health insurance totaled $263
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billion. These contributions imply that 2.4 percent of the total compensation of workers was made
up of pension contributions and 7.3 percent was made up of health insurance contributions (see
the "share of total compensation" figures in the bottom rows of Table 1).
The simulations displayed in column 2 show the results of imposing a low tax cap on
health insurance contributions but leaving pension contributions untaxed. The simulations suggest
that this policy would reduce employer contributions to health insurance by about $22.9 billion
(±$1.7 billion), or about 9 percent, and would reduce pension contributions by a relatively small
amount. Also, the relative shares of pensions and health insurance in total compensation would
remain unchanged (bottom rows of column 2).
Taxation of all employer contributions to health insurance (with pensions still untaxed)
would result in a larger reduction in health insurance contributions—see column 3. Health
insurance contributions would fall by about $38.7 billion (±$5.0 billion), or about 15 percent,
and pension contributions could also fall somewhat. The relative shares of pensions and health
insurance in total compensation would change only slightly (see the bottom rows of column 2).
Column 4 simulates the effects of including all employer contributions to employee
benefits in the income tax base (the Gephardt proposal). The simulations suggest that making
pension and health contributions taxable would reduce employer contributions to pension plans
by $42.8 billion (±$6.7 billion), or nearly 50 percent, and would reduce employer contributions
to health insurance by $52.9 billion (±$9.9 billion), or about 20 percent. Also, the share of
pensions in total compensation would fall by nearly a percentage point, to just 1.5 percent.7
Finally, column 5 simulates the impact of a consumption tax in which employer
contributions to health insurance are treated as consumption (the Nunn-Domenici and
Armey-Shelby-Spector proposals). The consumption tax removes the tax advantages of receiving
compensation as pensions, so employer contributions to pension plans drop—the simulations
suggest that they would have dropped by $33.9 billion (±$6.8 billion), or nearly 40 percent in
1994. Also, employer contributions to health insurance would have dropped by $31.8 billion
(±$8.5 billion), or by about 14 percent.
Clearly, taxing all employer contributions to employee benefit plans under the income tax
(the Gephardt proposal) or moving to a consumption tax in which health insurance contributions
were treated as consumption (the Nunn-Domenici and Armey-Shelby-Spector proposals) would
dramatically reduce employer contributions to pensions and health insurance. Would the effects
of these changes on the well-being of workers be equally dramatic? In the case of pension
benefits, the question turns on whether there would be alternative retirement saving vehicles and
whether workers would replace the lost pension savings with other forms of saving. If pension
contributions were taxed under the income tax (the Gephardt proposal), there would be no

7

The share of health insurance would remain roughly constant, even though expenditures would fall, because of the drop
in pension contributions.
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alternative retirement saving vehicle: Once pension contributions were taxed as current income,
the most attractive retirement saving vehicle available to most individuals would be gone. This
suggests that net savings could fall significantly if pension contributions were taxed as income.
In contrast, under a consumption tax, savings of any kind would go untaxed, so workers could
(perhaps reasonably) be expected to save enough to provide for their own retirements. In effect,
they could do for themselves what they had previously needed an employer to do for them—gain
access to a tax-favored vehicle of retirement saving. The ready availability of tax-favored
retirement saving to all workers, not just to those employed and covered by an employer-provided
plan, suggests that the implications of the consumption tax for the distribution of retirement
income could be salutary.8
Available empirical evidence gives some indication of whether workers would in fact save
and provide adequately for retirement in the face of declining pension contributions. The review
by Gale (1995) suggests that early estimates of how pensions affect saving tended to overstate the
degree to which pension contributions represented new saving. His estimates suggest that between
20 and 60 percent of pension contributions represent net additions to saving (as opposed to 80 to
100 percent, as many earlier studies found). In other words, reductions in pension contributions
would reduce net retirement savings substantially—by 20 to 60 percent of the reduction in total
pension contributions—but by less than 100 percent.
But existing empirical evidence on how pensions affect saving probably tells us little about
how moving to a consumption tax would affect net saving; all the existing evidence has been
derived from a setting in which pensions are tax-favored and other forms of saving are not
tax-favored. Under the consumption tax, savings of any sort would be tax-favored, suggesting
that decreases in employer contributions to pension plans would result in a less-significant decline
in net saving than would be suggested by Gale's summary estimate. Indeed, it is possible that
under a move to a consumption tax, there would be no net decrease in savings, despite significant
reductions in employer contributions to pension plans. Nevertheless, it seems fair to conclude that
whether workers would save and provide for retirement to the extent that employer-provided
pensions plans now do remains an open and potentially troubling question.
If net saving did fall in the wake of the loss of tax-favored treatment of pensions, then in
the long-run the reformed system would have serious costs, both private (to those who failed to
save adequately) and public (if the resulting low retirement incomes were perceived as a problem
requiring a public response in the form of income transfers and an expanded social security
system). Taxing employer contributions to pensions under the income tax, for example, would
seem to be an almost certain recipe for an expanded social security system.

8

There are, of course, tax-favored vehicles of retirement saving now available to the self-employed (Keough plans) and
to workers who are not covered by an employer-provided plan and whose earnings are within certain limits (Individual
Retirement Accounts). But access to these vehicles is less simple than access to tax-deferred saving would be under a
consumption tax.
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Health insurance benefits would also become less generous under the proposed tax
reforms, suggesting a shift toward more basic health insurance, with greater emphasis on true
insurance and less on tax-free health benefits. Most observers would see this as a positive
development—a health care sector bloated by favorable tax treatment has long been criticized by
economists. However, Gruber and Poterba (1996) have recently questioned the extent to which
removing the tax-favored treatment of employer-provided health care can be expected to stem the
growth of the health care sector.
As already mentioned, these simulations, like all simulations, need to be taken with the
usual grain of salt. They represent extrapolations based on behavioral estimates that derive from
data that are 8 to 14 years old and have a sizable degree of uncertainty associated with them (as
reported in Table 1). But the nature of simulation is to make the best of an imperfect situation in
order to provide informed impressions about the impacts of alternative policies.
III. Summary
The story told by the simulations shown in Table 1 is rather simple: Taxing all employer
contributions to employee-benefit plans under the existing personal income tax, or moving to a
consumption tax in which pensions are no longer tax-favored and in which health insurance
contributions are considered consumption, would reduce pension coverage by between 3 and 9
percentage points and health insurance coverage by between .5 and 5.5 percentage points. These
reductions are significant but by no means apocalyptic, although many employers would say that
they are underestimates of the reductions that would occur. Much larger reductions (in
proportional terms) would come in the dollar amounts that employers contribute to pensions and
health insurance: The simulations suggest that under a consumption tax, pension contributions
would fall by nearly 40 percent and health insurance contributions would fall by nearly 15
percent. And if employer contributions to pensions and health insurance were included in the
income tax base, pension contributions would fall by nearly 50 percent and health insurance
contributions would fall by about 20 percent. Together, the findings that coverage would be
reduced somewhat while contributions would fall dramatically (especially for pensions) suggests
that employer-provided pension and health insurance plans, while still available to roughly
one-half or more of all workers, would be far less generous under a consumption tax than they
have been (and similarly if benefits were taxed under the existing income tax). To a far greater
extent than in the past, it would be up to workers to save for retirement and to pay directly for
their own health care.

9
References
Bradford, David F. Untangling the Income Tax. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1986.
Feldstein, Martin S. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance." Journal of Political
Economy 81 (March/April 1973): 251-280.
Gale, William G. "The Effects of Pensions on Wealth: A Re-Evaluation of Theory and
Evidence." Draft manuscript, The Brookings Institution, June 1995.
Gruber, Jonathan and James Poterba. "Fundamental Tax Reform and Employer-Provided Health
Insurance." Paper prepared for the Brookings Institution Conference on Fundamental Tax
Reform, February 1996.
Heitzman, Robert E., Jr. "Pensions in a Flat World." Issue Brief. Washington, D.C.: American
Academy of Actuaries, October 1995.
Hutchens, Robert M. "Seniority, Wages, and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade." Journal of
Economic Perspectives 3 (Fall 1989): 49-64.
Munnell, Alicia H. "It's Time to Tax Employee Benefits." In Proceedings of the Forty -First
Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association. Madison, Wisconsin:
IRRA, 1989. Pp. 374-386.
Reagan, Patricia B. and John A. Turner. "Youth, Taxes, and Pension Coverage." Manuscript,
Department of Economics, Ohio State University, August 1994.
Rosen, Sherwin. "Does the Composition of Pay Matter?" In Employee Benefits, Labor Costs, and
Labor Markets in Canada and the U.S., edited by W.T. Alpert and S.A. Woodbury.
Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute, 1996.
Salisbury, Dallas L. "Employee Benefits in a Flat Tax or Consumption Tax World." EBRI
Notes, volume 16, number 9 (Employee Benefit Research Institute, September 1995).
Salisbury, Dallas L., Ken McDonnell, and Edina Rheem. "The Changing World of Work and
Employee Benefits." EBRI Issue Briefs, Number 192 (April 1996).
Silverman, Celia and others. EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits, third edition. Washington,
D.C.: Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1995.

10
Snider, Sarah C. and Paul Fronstin. "Source of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the
Uninsured, Analysis of the March 1994 Current Population Survey." EBRI Issue Brief
no, 158 (Employee Benefit Research Institute, February 1995).
Topel, Robert. "Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority." Journal
of Political Economy 99 (February 1991): 145-176.
Woodbury, Stephen A. and Douglas R. Bettinger. "The Decline of Fringe-Benefit Coverage in
the 1980s." In Structural Changes in U.S. Labor Markets: Causes and Consequences,
edited by R.W. Eberts and E.L. Groshen. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991. Pp.
105-138.
Woodbury, Stephen A. and Wei-Jang Huang. The Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits. Kalamazoo,
Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute, 1991.

11
Table 1
Simulated Changes in Employee-Benefit Coverage, Employer Contributions to Benefit Plans,
and Compensation Shares Under Various Tax Reforms, 1993-1994
(Estimated simulation error in parentheses)1
Tax Treatment
of Employer Contributions:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

to Pension Plans:

Deferred

Deferred

Deferred

Taxable

No Advantage

to Health Insurance Plans:

No Tax

Low tax cap

Taxable

Taxable

Taxable

57.0
(--)
67.8
(--)

-0.1
(0.1)
-0.8
(0.7)

-0.3
(0.2)
-2.6
(2.1)

-6.2
(2.7)
-3.1
(2.3)

-5.5
(2.3)
-2.3
(2.0)

-1.5
(.6)
-22.9
(1.7)

-3.8
(1.8)
-38.7
(5.0)

-42.8
(6.7)
-52.9
(9.9)

-33.9
(6.8)
-31.8
(8.5)

0.0
(.1)
0.1
(.1)

-0.1
(.1)
0.1
(.2)

-0.9
(.2)
0.0
(.3)

-0.8
(.2)
0.1
(.3)

Employee Coverage2 (%):
Pensions
Health Ins.

Employer Contributions3 (in $ billions) to:
Pensions
Health Ins.

87.7
(--)
263.0
(--)

Share of Total Compensation3 (%):
Pensions
Health Ins.

2.4
(--)
7.3
(--)

Notes: Column (1) gives actual benefit coverage, employer contributions, and compensation shares in the most recent
available year (1993 or 1994). Columns 2 through 5 show the simulated changes that would result from changing the tax
treatment of benefits as shown in the column headings. Columns 2, 3, and4 show the impacts of reforms occurring under
the existing income tax: Column 2 gives the effects of a low tax-cap on health insurance contributions, column 3 gives
the effects of taxing all employer contributions to health insurance, and column 4 gives the effects of taxing all employer
contributions to both pensions and health insurance, all under the existing income tax. (The last of these proposed changes
is the Gephardt proposal.) In contrast, column 5 gives the effects of replacing the existing income tax with a consumption
tax that treats employer contributions to health insurance as consumption (as in the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax proposal
and the Armey-Shelby-Spector flat tax proposals).
1. Adding the estimated simulation error to the point estimate gives the upper bound of the 95-percent confidence
interval around the point estimate, and subtracting the estimated simulation error from the point estimate gives the lower
bound of the 95-percent confidence interval. See the text for further discussion.
2. Coverage figures are for 1993. See Silverman and others (1995) and Snider and Fronstin (1995). Coverage is
defined as the percentage of wage and salary workers (aged 25 and older who had earnings in the previous year) included
in an employer-provided pension or group health insurance plan.
3. Employer contributions and shares of total compensation are for 1994. See Survey of Current Business 76
(January/February 1996), tables 6.3C and 6.11C.
Source: Simulations based on estimates reported in Woodbury and Bettinger (1991) and Woodbury and Huang (1991).

